IEDs and Their Impact on Mine Action
This article addresses the increasingly prevalent threat of improvised explosive devices around the world. The author carefully defines this often unpredictable and unconventional “weapon of choice” and outlines the steps to eliminate the hazard it
presents to global security. The article also discusses the role IEDs play within the
scope of mine action, arguing their danger exceeds that of traditional mines and other
unexploded ordnance.

by Adrian King [ Hazard Management Solutions, Ltd. ]

Figure 1: IED incidents for selected regions and countries in 2008 and during May/June 2009.
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This illustration shows the construction of an IED used to destroy the U.N. building in Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003.
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF HAZARD MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS
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t is well-reported that improvised explosive devices create a lethal and prevailing threat that is responsible for hundreds
of deaths across the globe each month. The
question of how the escalating presence of
IEDs will impact mine action should be addressed, alongside the issue of how we can
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improve our understanding of the threat and
what actions need to be taken to reduce it.
IEDs have become synonymous with the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To
an outsider (based on media reporting) IED
use by terrorists and insurgents appears to be
focused solely in these theaters; however, IEDs

are in fact a global problem and have been in
use for a considerable period of time. Wherever the militarily weak or poorly resourced
confront superior forces with advanced technologies in armed conflict, IEDs provide an
ideal weapon in much the same way landmines
do. Throughout modern history, states, individuals, and criminal and terrorist groups have
used them to murder, intimidate, extort and
destabilize the infrastructure of government
and undermine the rule of law.
In the mine-action community, IEDs, although often recognized as significant threats
where prevalent, are not generally understood
or analyzed in any depth. As a result, the advice provided for mine-risk education and the
formulation of procedures that humanitariandemining and battle-area-clearance personnel must adopt for IED removal and disposal

are questionable. A number of possible reasons
exist as to why mine action has failed to incorporate effective countermeasures to IEDs.
Primarily, the International Mine Action Standards have never fully addressed the subject.
As a result, the expertise required to properly
analyze the impact of IEDs and thereby identify the requirement for action has not been
resourced. No generic doctrine exists to form
a basis for the development of IED standard
operating procedures, IED-risk education,
country assessment and threat analysis, for
both the security of personnel and the conduct
of mine clearance and related operations.
In Figure 1, the IED threat is shown by the
number of IED incidents occurring in sample regions and countries during 2008, and those recorded from 1 May through 30 June 2009. From
the data provided, the number of incidents is
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What is an IED?

Dealing with a booby-trapped cache of IED components buried inside a refuse bin.
PHOTO COURTESY OF HMS

clearly very high, and although fatalities and injuries are not given, they are likely to be significantly
higher than those caused by landmines. Landmine
casualties are rarely high for a single incident,
whereas an IED contained in a truck and initiated
in a busy marketplace can claim tens or even hundreds of victims. In Iraq alone during 2007, 5,480
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civilian deaths were recorded as a result of multifatality bombings,3 whereas 5,426 casualties were
recorded globally for mine-related injuries, including victim-operated IEDs for the same period.1
These IED statistics have not been included as a
comparison to mine-related injuries, but simply
to show the prevalence of IED use.

According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2008, an improvised explosive device is
“a device placed or produced in an improvised
manner incorporating explosives or noxious
chemicals. An IED may be victim-operated or
command-detonated. Victim-operated IEDs
are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but
command-detonated IEDs are not.” 1
IEDs are normally categorized by their
method of initiation, such as timer-activated,
command-fired or victim-operated. They are
then further subcategorized by their explosive
effect: blast, blast/fragmentation, incendiary or
blast/incendiary. The method of delivery is a
further type of classification, e.g., to the target—
vehicle-borne IED, person-borne IED (suicide)
or water-borne IED. Each method of initiation
has its advantages and disadvantages, and the
perpetrator will normally decide on the method of employment by the type of target to be
attacked and its accessibility. For example, for
exact targeting of a vehicle convoy, commandfired IEDs with a large payload offer the greatest opportunity for success for the perpetrator,
who can choose the precise time of detonation
to overcome a vehicle’s armor and attack the
individuals inside. In other circumstances, a
time-initiated IED may be better-suited, where
escape of the bomb-layer is deemed essential
and command firing cannot be considered due
to the security infrastructure or the nature and
situation of the target. Suicide IED attacks can
be carried out at any location, providing security can be negotiated, and suicide bombers
have perpetrated some of the most devastating attacks. Victim-operated devices, although
essentially random, can be targeted, such as in
the form of an under-vehicle IED. Until recently, IED incidents generally occurred as a result
of planned and targeted attacks on individuals
or organizations. Currently, however, IEDs can
be utilized almost anywhere, in any location
or terrain, and in any area of the battlefield,
where inevitably they will eventually impinge

on mine-action operations and activities. In
Afghanistan, for example, IEDs are used as
a tactical weapon, targeting International Security Assistance Force troops and affecting force mobility, but IEDs also have the
capability to considerably affect operational
aims and even strategic planning. They are
used in Afghanistan to deny ground, protect
troop positions and serve as an early warning
of attack in much the same way as a conventional alarm mine. In Colombia and Nepal,
IEDs are also employed as a protective measure in the same way as a defensive minefield,
but they are sometimes placed with the facility to fire the devices on command as opposed
to being victim-operated.
Current trends in IED manufacture indicate a growing use of command-fired devices,
especially those employing a radio signal as
the method of arming and initiating. This
progression is one seen globally, with perpetrators taking advantage of communications
and radio technologies available worldwide.
Insurgents used radio-controlled IEDs in Iraq
in most attacks on Coalition Forces, where
remote-controlled roadside bombs caused
many casualties in the mid-stages of the recent conflict. Electronic countermeasures were
then developed to jam the insurgents’ radio signals as forces travelled through the range of
the device’s radio receiver. Insurgents responded by introducing infrared switches armed remotely by radio signal outside the range of the
electronic-countermeasure equipment, where a
passing vehicle or foot patrol could trigger the
device. Afghanistan has shown similar trends,
but instead of infrared switches, electroniccountermeasure equipment is defeated by using long command wires from a distant vantage
point with a good view of the device location.
Recently, however, as command-wire detection procedures have become more successful,
simple victim-activated devices have been used
in significant numbers. These IEDs are manufactured using predominately nonmetallic and
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A U.S. soldier guards a road in Afghanistan where the command wire for an IED was found, August 2009.
PHOTO COURTESY OF DIMA GAVRRYSH / AP

nonmagnetic materials, making them difficult
to locate with conventional detection equipment.
As technology development has advanced in
countering the IED threat, the perpetrators have
responded by changing their methods of attack
and device construction. Therefore, defeating the
device is now considered just one element of a
much broader effort in which substantial multifaceted resources are now being applied to intercept the IED attack cycle at all levels (such as at the
stage of device manufacturing, or even sourcing
device components). The ultimate objective is to
stop the device from being laid in the first place.
Mine-action Implications

Within the International Mine Action Standards, IEDs do not feature prominently as being a target for specific clearance activity. They
are referred to in the levels of qualification for
demining/explosive-ordnance-disposal operations,
but this reference is not in detail. The ability of
a mine-clearing entity to competently deal with
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IEDs, should they be encountered, is left to specialist mine-clearance staff, who may be inadequately prepared.
Organizations undertaking mine-clearance
tasks rely heavily on the employment of personnel with military or similar backgrounds
to undertake the more difficult EOD tasks, and
IEDs certainly fall within this category. However, this reliance is a dangerous precedent, as
nations’ training standards for IED disposal
vary considerably, and the differing levels of
expertise can present a risk to civilians and the
individuals undertaking IED disposal tasks.
This fact has been clearly illustrated by NATO
operations in Afghanistan where inadequately trained and equipped personnel have been
killed performing tasks beyond their capability and where national EOD doctrine did not
include IED-disposal operations.
Much more could be done to establish generic
operating procedures for deminers and implement basic instructions for assessing and dealing with IEDs. Under the current structure of

the IMAS documentation, there is the ability to
publish technical annexes for complex weapon
systems or specialist EOD tasks. As an interim
measure, IEDs and IED-disposal operations
could be addressed in such a document, giving
basic knowledge, generic standard operating
procedures for search-and-disposal action, and
the corresponding minimum equipment requirements—including the personal protective
equipment required for demining operations in
locations where IEDs may be encountered.
Clearing IEDs presents the deminer with
a number of difficult decisions. Unlike a landmine or item of unexploded ordnance, IEDs are
improvised to the extent of the imagination of
the bomb-maker, so there is no guide or diagram that can be followed to formulate a structured neutralization or disarming plan. There
are, however, courses of action to take based on
assessment of the threat conditions and by a process of deduction, evaluation of the likely type of
device, and the best method of clearance. However, due to the nature of the task and even with
the benefit of knowledge and experience, IED
defeat operations are often only calculated leaps
into the unknown, where the level of specialist
training and equipment sophistication can be
critical in achieving a successful outcome.
MRE, although normally of a very high standard, rarely addresses IED threats in full, which
vary between regions and countries in the same
way as a landmine or UXO threat. Inclusion of
an IED module in such education programs
should be considered a priority where the threat
exists and affects daily life, and the program
must include an accurate threat analysis of the
country or area in question. Generic briefings,
although they have their place, may not correctly address specific threats, leaving critical gaps
in knowledge that could lead to the use of inadequate drills and regimes. IED briefings should
also form part of any pre-deployment training
for mine-action staff, whatever their level of involvement. Personnel designated to operate in
post-conflict areas where the ground situation
has not been fully resolved should expect to be
targeted by IEDs and must therefore receive appropriate education before they are deployed.

Conclusion

IEDs pose an unconventional and relatively
unpredictable threat. They cannot be countered
by traditional means. Mine-action personnel,
although used to following convention and
doctrine within regulated organizations, will
be at risk if they continue to serve without considering the growing global use of IEDs. These
devices will continue to kill and maim a greater number of innocent victims than mines or
UXO for the foreseeable future. They are the
“weapon of choice” for non-state actors, and
their use is widespread. It is inevitable that
those actively involved in mine-action operations will encounter IEDs far more frequently
than ever before. Intervention at the clearance
level is occurring now, and we must ensure that
personnel are equipped with a thorough assessment of the risk, and that adequate provisions
are made to mitigate threats.
See Endnotes, Page 79
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